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REAP WHAT YOU SOW: SOIL POLLUTION 
REMEDIATION REFORM IN CHINA 
Dustin D. Drenguis † 
Abstract: As China undergoes the fastest economic development in the history of 
the world, so too has its environmental problems shattered all precedents.  While China’s 
leaders recognize they must change course, environmental concerns have long taken a 
back seat to economic development.  Soil pollution is destroying China’s environment, 
affecting public health, and reducing the country’s food supply.  Soil pollution slows 
China’s economic development, preventing land development in urban centers.  Soil 
pollution also threatens China’s social stability because it has inspired marginalized 
groups to organize in protest of environmental conditions.  Environmental remediation, 
or the obligations of a facility or the government to clean up land contaminates, is 
essential in China.  But China’s environmental remediation laws are ambiguous, poorly 
enforced, and often entirely unobserved.  In order to respond to these challenges, the 
central government needs to develop a remediation scheme that: 1) requires strict liability 
to remediate soil pollution with appropriate exceptions; 2) evaluates the degree of 
remediation needed for a particular site; 3) utilizes the cadre system’s promotion targets 
to ensure enforcement; and 4) promotes more public transparency to relieve the public’s 
anxiety.  These changes will serve both environmental and economic interests.  
I.  INTRODUCTION  
When the Rongping factory opened in 1994 in the town of Xiping, 
Fujian Province, it seemed like an economic savior.  The chemical plant 
doubled the town’s population and quickly accounted for one-third of the 
county’s tax base.1  But after the factory opened, villagers noticed dying 
bamboo groves, fewer fish in the river, and a strange smell from the green 
slime in the river.2  Illness and cancer rates grew.3  Zhang Changjian, a local 
“barefoot doctor”4 in Xiping, noticed these changes and began to petition the 
government in 1999 for soil remediation, arguing that the factory or 
government were obligated to clean up soil contaminates. 5   A high 
                                                      
† Juris Doctor expected 2014, University of Washington School of Law.  The author would like to 
thank Professor Dongsheng Zang for his assistance in developing this comment.  Any errors or omissions 
are the author’s own. 
1  Shai Oster, In Booming China, A Doctor Battles A Polluting Factory; Fouled Waters Lead to 
Flood of Protests Nationwide; Officials’ Mixed Messages; Inspired by Erin Brockovich, 248 WALL ST. J. E. 
EDITION A1 (July 19, 2006), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115325157476810126.html. 
2  Id.  
3  Duan Hongqing, Thirteenth year not the end in Village’s Fight Against Pollution, CAIJING 
MAGAZINE Sept. 2005 (China) available at http://english.caijing.com.cn/2005-09-05/100043252.html. 
4  Barefoot doctors are individuals who have received basic medical education, usually training at a 
county hospital for three to six months, and work in rural areas of China.  See Daqing Zhang & Paul 
Unschuld, China’s Barefoot Doctors: Past, Present, and Future, 372 THE LANCET 1865 (2008).  
5  Oster, supra note 1. 
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concentration of chromium, a known human carcinogen, 6  was found in 
Xingping’s soil and water.7  After years of unanswered letters, in 2001 Dr. 
Zhang was instructed by China’s top environmental agency to organize a 
formal complaint.8   Eventually 1,721 villagers joined the lawsuit.9   The 
county government shut down Dr. Zhang’s clinic.10  The doctor claimed 
thugs assaulted him and his wife as a consequence of their efforts.11  Despite 
these obstacles, the Xiping villagers’ case is one of China’s rare 
environmental success stories. 12   The court awarded the plaintiffs 
USD 85,000, with the average plaintiff getting about USD 50.13  
For years, China has prioritized rapid economic growth over all other 
concerns, 14  but recent government rhetoric has favored stronger 
environmental protection.  China elevated the position of environment and 
energy in the country’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan, establishing high-priority 
national targets for energy intensity and pollution reduction.15  The plan also 
included supporting policies and funding mechanisms.16  The policies and 
funding have added more teeth to the environmental rhetoric.  A few 
environmental targets were given the highest-level priorities.  According to 
Professor Kan, “the Chinese government invested USD 1.6 billion annually, 
0.51% of China’s GDP, on environmental protection; in 2008, the number 
increased to USD 66 billion, reaching 1.49% of China’s GDP.”17  In 2008, 
the State Environmental Protection Administration (“SEPA”) was elevated to 
the ministry level position18 and renamed the Ministry of Environmental 
                                                      
6  AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, TOXFAQS FOR CHROMIUM (Oct. 2012), 
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxfaqs/tf.asp?id=61&tid=17. 
7  Duan Hongqing, supra note 3. 
8  Oster, supra note 1. 
9  Id.  
10  Id  
11  Id.  
12  Alex Wang, The Role of Law in Environmental Protection in China: Recent Developments, 8 VT. 
J. ENVTL. L. 196, 214 (2007).  The Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims (“CLAPV”) assisted 
Mr. Zhang and the villagers in the case.  Id. at 213.  Later, Professor Wang notes that the courts application 
of the correct legal doctrine could in part be attributed to the experience of the litigators.  Id. at 219.  
13  Oster, supra note 1.  
14  Over the past three decades, China’s GDP has grown by 9% annually.  No country has moved up 
the economic ladder as quickly as China.  PHILLIP STALLEY, FOREIGN FIRMS, INVESTMENT, AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1 (2010). 
15  Alex L. Wang, China’s Environmental Tipping Point, in CHINA IN AND BEYOND THE HEADLINES 
112, 114 (Timothy B. Weston & Lionel M. Jensen eds., 2012).  Note:  the Eleventh Five-Year Plan was 
promulgated in 2006 and ran until 2010.  These five-year plans are a series of social and economic 
development initiatives.   
16  Id. 
17  See Haidong Kan, Environment and Health in China: Challenges and Opportunities, 117 ENVTL. 
HEALTH PERSP. 530 (Dec. 2009), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2799473/. 
18  China Upgrades Environmental Administration to Ministry, XINHUA NEWS (China) (Mar. 11, 
2008, 4:19 PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-03/11/content_7766369.htm. 
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Protection (“MEP”).19  With the elevation, the MEP enjoys a greater voice in 
decision-making and is less subject to opposing interests.20  
While China has begun to acknowledge environmental concerns, there 
is still much room for improvement.  China’s ambitions to develop its 
economy have not slowed; it aims to quadruple its 2000 GDP by the year 
2020.21  As recently as 2010, the minister of the MEP publicly stated that 
China’s current environmental situation could be summarized as “partly 
improved but remains uncontrolled as a whole, with increasing pressures.”22  
In 2005, Xie Zhenhua, the minister of the MEP, was forced to resign due to 
the Jilin chemical plant incident.23  Explosions at the plant killed six, lead to 
the evacuation of thousands, and created an eighty kilometer toxic slick of 
benzene24 and nitrobenzene25 in the Songhua River.26  Although neither Mr. 
Xie nor the MEP were involved with the cover-up, his removal indicates that 
the central government may hold officials accountable for environmental 
disasters on their watch.27  However, a year after his resignation, Mr. Xie 
was appointed vice minister of the more powerful National Development 
and Reform Commission (“NDRC”) 28—arguably a promotion.  
Although Dr. Zhang and the Xiping villagers’ success marks an 
improvement in legal accountability in Chinese environmental policy, their 
                                                      
19   ELIZABETH C. ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK: THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE TO 
CHINA’S FUTURE 111 (2d. ed. 2010).  
20  Id.  For a recent example of the MEP throwing its weight around, see Eric Ng & Li Jing, Oil 
Giants Barred from new Projects After Missing Pollution Targets, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Aug. 30, 
2013, 5:02 AM), http://www.scmp.com/business/companies/article/1300306/china-environment-ministry-
suspends-some-approvals-sinopec-cnpc. 
21  Haidong Kan, supra note 17.  
22  Wu Jingjing, The Environment has been Partly Improved but Remains Uncontrolled as a Whole: 
Zhou Shengxian Talked About Exploring a new way for Environmental Protection, XINHUA DAILY 
TELEGRAPH (China) (Nov. 27, 2010, 11:20 AM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/mrdx/2010-
11/27/c_13624608.htm.  See also WANG JIN & HOUFU YAN, BARRIERS AND SOLUTIONS TO BETTER 
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA 495 (Int’l Network for Envtl. Compliance and Enforcement ed., 
2011), http://inece.org/conference/9/proceedings/56_WangYan.pdf (quoting Minister Zhenhua’s 
statements). 
23 See Shai Oster, China’s Climate Negotiator Has Toxic History, WALL ST. J.  (Dec. 17, 2009), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2009/12/17/china%E2%80%99s-climate-negotiator-has-toxic-history/. 
24  Benzene is a known human carcinogen.  See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., 
NATIONAL TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM, REPORT ON CARCINOGENS, BENZENE 60 (2011).  
25  At low nitrobenzene concentrations, symptoms include fatigue, weakness, dyspnea, headache, and 
dizziness.  At higher concentrations, depressed respiration, bluish-gray skin, disturbed vision, and coma 
may occur.  U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, HAZARD SUMMARY: NITROBENZENE (Jan. 2000), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/ttnatw01/hlthef/nitroben.html.  
26  China Pledges to Minimize Impact of River Pollution on Russia, XINHUA (China) (Nov. 24, 2005), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-11/24/content_3831641.htm.  
27  See Wu Jiao, Recycling Officials, is it Right? CHINA DAILY (Jan. 10, 2007),  
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-01/10/content_779115.htm.  
28  CHARLES R. MCELWEE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN CHINA: MITIGATING RISK AND ENSURING 
COMPLIANCE 83 n.18 (2011). 
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proceedings also demonstrate its failures.  Today, the soil around the 
chemical plant remains untreated and polluted.29  The bamboo crops are still 
damaged and villagers say there is no market for their produce because 
people fear the food is tainted. 30   The land is still poisoned from the 
Rongping factory pollutants.31   
This comment focuses on a neglected aspect of China’s environmental 
law:  soil remediation.  Remediation requirements obligate entities to treat 
polluted soil. 32   Part II describes the effects of soil pollution and the 
problems it presents to China.  Soil pollution threatens China’s environment, 
economic development, and social stability.  Part III argues that China’s 
current legal framework for soil pollution is faulty.  The current laws are 
ambiguous, poorly enforced by local officials, and often entirely 
unobserved. Chinese tort and criminal laws may theoretically provide an 
alternative solution to regulation, but they too are ineffective.  Finally, 
Part IV proposes that in order to respond to these challenges, the central 
government needs to develop a remediation scheme that:  1) imposes strict 
liability to remediate soil pollution; 2) evaluates the degree of remediation 
needed for a particular site; 3) utilizes the cadre system’s promotion targets 
to ensure enforcement; and 4) promotes more public transparency to relieve 
the public’s anxiety.   
II.  CHINA’S SOIL REMEDIATION POLICY IS ESSENTIAL TO THE 
ENVIRONMENT, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND SOCIAL HARMONY 
Before getting into the weeds of environmental remediation law, it is 
important to understand why soil pollution and remediation is crucial in 
China.  Soil pollution threatens China’s public health through direct 
exposure and contamination of the country’s food supply.  Economic 
development has been constrained because many contaminated sites are in 
urban centers and the land cannot be re-developed.  Soil pollution also 
disrupts China’s social stability.  As a result, marginalized groups have 
started to organize in protest of environmental conditions.  The combination 
of these three problems makes soil pollution an issue the Chinese 
government should take seriously.  
                                                      
29  Oster, supra note 1.  
30  Id.  
31  Id.  
32  See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DIRECTIVE NO. 9200.4-25, SOIL CLEANUP CRITERIA IN 40 
CFR PART 192 (1998),  http://www.epa.gov/superfund/health /conmedia/soil/cleanup.htm. 
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A.  Soil Pollution Threatens China’s Public Health Through Direct 
Exposure and Contamination of China’s Crops 
The central government has not disclosed the exact degree of 
pollution in China’s soil,33 but all signs indicate a critical problem.  The 
government commissioned a six-year soil survey involving 30,000 people, 
but the academics leading the project were forbidden from releasing 
preliminary findings.34  Meanwhile, over one million tons of untreated toxic 
waste has accumulated across China. 35   In 2005, government officials 
demanded the safe disposal of four million tons of chromium stockpiled in 
nineteen provinces.36  The NDRC reported that most of the waste was not 
properly disposed and instead was discharged directly into the 
environment.37 
Once in the soil, soil pollution can contaminate land for centuries.38  
Polluted soil can be transmitted directly into the human body through soil 
ingestion, contaminated water pathways, or dermal contact. 39   All 
individuals in contact with polluted soil ingest at least small quantities of 
soil because soil adheres to hands and unwashed food.40  Small children are 
particularly susceptible because of their tendency to consume soil directly.41  
Soil pollutants can affect water quality from surface runoff and erosion.42  
Approximately 78% of streams that run through urban areas are unsafe for 
                                                      
33  Jonathan Watts, The Clean-up Begins on China’s Dirty Secret—Soil Pollution, THE GUARDIAN 
(June 12, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/jun/12/china-soil-pollution-bonn-challenge.  
When Beijing lawyer Dong Zhengwei requested data from the 2006 survey, he was informed the survey is 
a state secret.  Christina Larson, Soil Pollution is a State Secret in China. BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK 
(Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-02-25/soil-pollution-is-a-state-secret-in-china.  
34  Watts, supra note 33.  
35  Zhou Wenting, Huge Stockpiles of Toxic Waste in 12 Provinces, CHINA DAILY (Aug. 31, 2011), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2011-08/31/content_13224360.htm .  
36  Id.  
37  Id.  
38  See Bao Xiaodong & Zhang Xinyuan, Building on Toxic Land, SOUTHERN WEEKEND (China), 
(Dec. 1, 2012), translated in CHINADIALOGUE.NET,  
http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/4726.  Similarly, heavy metals do not decompose like 
organic pollutants.  See Chen Huamian et al., Heavy Metal Pollution in Soils in China: Status and 
Countermeasures, 28 ROYAL SWEDISH ACAD. OF SCI. 130, 132 (1999). 
39  John Hawley, Assessment of Health Risk from Exposure to Contaminated Soil, 5 RISK ANALYSIS 4, 
289 (1985).  
40  P.W. Abrahams, Soils, Their Implications to Human Health, 291 SCI. OF THE TOTAL ENV’T. 1, 2 
(2002).  
41  See Sue Binder & David Sokal, Estimating Soil Indigestion: the Use of Tracer Elements in 
Estimating the Amount of Soil Ingested by Young Children, 41 ARCHIVES OF ENVTL. HEATH 341 (1986).  
42  See Susanna T.Y. Tong & Wenli Chen,  Modeling the Relationship Between Land Use and 
Surface Water Quality, 66 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 377 (2002).  
176 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 23 NO. 1 
 
drinking 43  and over 500 million Chinese do not have access to potable 
water.44  Pollutants can also be transferred directly through contact with the 
skin.  For example, in nineteen U.S. Superfund sites, dermal pathway was 
considered to be the biggest carcinogenic risk associated with soil 
contamination.45 
Soil pollution threatens China’s food safety.46  Zhou Jianmin, director 
of the China Soil Association, estimated that one-tenth of China's farmland 
is affected by soil pollution.47  Heavy metals in soil adversely affect plant 
growth. 48   Moreover, plants may absorb contaminates and become 
contaminated as well.  About 16% of China’s 120 million hectares of 
farmland suffer from pollution and 10 million acres are affected by industrial 
pollution.49  Studies from 2002 and 2007 indicate that 10% of rice grown in 
China is contaminated by cadmium, a heavy metal that affects liver function 
and bone health. 50   Many Chinese simply cannot afford to buy non-
contaminated rice,51 while others remain ignorant of the problem.52 
Once soil pollutants enter the human body, either through direct 
exposure or food contamination, they may accumulate.  Pollutants 
accumulate in the body because many are not biodegradable. 53   This 
accumulation results in severe health effects.   
Chinese industry is one source of soil pollution.  Smelters and battery 
factories in China release lead into the environment.54  Lead is a neurotoxin 
                                                      
43  Jie Chen, Rapid Urbanization in China: a real Challenge to Soil Protection and Food Security, 69 
CATENA 1, 9 (2007).  
44  China to Supply Safe Drinking Water for 160 Million Rural People in Five Years, PEOPLE’S DAILY 
ONLINE (Aug. 31, 2006), http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200608/31/eng20060831_298275.html. 
45  Abrahams, supra note 40, at 11.  
46  For example, researchers found high levels of arsenic in the rice plants and vegetables growing 
near mining and smelting industries.  The people in the city had elevated levels of arsenic in their hair 
samples. See Xiao-Yong Liao et al., Soil as Contamination and its Risk Assessment in Areas near the 
Industrial Districts of Chenzhou City, Southern China, 31 ENV’T INT’L 791, 791-92 (2005).  
47 Watts, supra note 33. 
48  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MY CHILDREN HAVE BEEN POISONED: A PUBLIC HEALTH CRISIS IN FOUR 
CHINESE PROVINCES 14 (2011).  
49  Pollutants, Pesticides Threaten Farmland, CHINA DAILY (June 12, 2012), 
http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-06/12/content_15496596.htm.  
50  Gong Jing, Heavy Metals Tainting China’s Rice Bowls, CAIXING ONLINE (Feb. 14, 2011), 
http://english.caixin.com/2011-02-13/100224762.html. 
51  Id. 
52  Id.  
53  Tao Chen et al., Identification of Trace Element Sources and Associated Risk Assessment in 
Vegetable Soils of the Urban-Rural Transitional Area of Hangzhou, China, 151 ENVTL. POLLUTION 67 
(2008).   
54  China’s battery industry, one of the main culprits of lead contamination, has grown 20% every 
year from 2007 to 2011.  See Sharon LaFraniere, Lead Poisoning in China: The Hidden Scourge, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/15/world/asia/15lead.html?pagewanted=all.  In 
2009, 600 children were found to have lead poisoning in a single incident in Shaanxi Province.  Two weeks 
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that is especially harmful to children’s behavioral and cognitive 
development.55  Mercury is harmful as well: Chinese workers engaged in 
mercury smelting demonstrate bleeding gums, shaking hands, and twitching 
eyes, while cattle in the same region have shorter lifespans and develop bone 
deformation.56  Cheap Chinese “brick” tea contains high levels of fluoride, 
which contributes to dental and skeletal fluorosis.57  Rice in southern China 
has been contaminated with cadmium.58   Cadmium has polluted the soil in 
some Chinese villages since before the 1960s.59   
Farmers themselves are also a source of soil pollution.  A study from 
Renmin University found that farmers used 40% more fertilizer than crops 
needed, causing about 10 million tons of fertilizer to be discharged into the 
environment every year. 60   Excess fertilizer washes into waterways and 
results in eutrophication, a phenomenon that occurs when too many nutrients 
cause excessive plant growth and starve fish of oxygen.61  Nitrogen from 
fertilizers can also cause methemoglobinemia in infants, a blood disorder 
that can result in brain damage or death.62   
While China must address contamination in the soil due to past 
practices, environmental accidents continue to make the situation worse.  In 
2012, twenty tons of cadmium were discharged into the Longjiang river, 
                                                                                                                                                              
later in an unrelated incident, 1,300 children in Hunan Province were reported to have lead poisoning.  
Johnathan Watts, 1,300 Children get Lead Poisoning from Year-Old Factory in China, THE GUARDIAN 
(Aug. 20, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/20/china-children-mass-lead-poisoning. 
55  See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, PREVENTING LEAD EXPOSURE IN YOUNG 
CHILDREN: A HOUSING BASED APPROACH TO PRIMARY PREVENTION OF LEAD POISONING 8 (Oct. 2004), 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/lead/publications/PrimaryPreventionDocument.pdf. 
56   Chen Huamian, supra note 38, at 132. 
57  See J. Cao, et. al., Fluorosis Induced by Drinking Brick Tea, 29 FLUORIDE 139, 139-42 (1996).  
58  See Cui Yuijing, et al., Exposures to Metal Mixtures and Human Health Impacts in a 
Contaminated Area in Nanjing, China, 31 ENVTL. INT’L 784 (2005).  
59  Gong Jing, supra note 50.  See also Liang Chen, A Poisoned River, GLOBAL TIMES (China) (May 
24, 2011), http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/658614.shtml (describing cadmium pollution in the 
Xiangjiang River).  Villagers often have no choice but to eat the contaminated rice they cultivate.  A 
woman from Xinma village in Human Province described the situation: “[p]eople with money can avoid 
the bad rice, but the rest of us just have to live with it.”  Jing Gong, China’s Tainted Rice Trail (2), 
CENTURY WKLY (China) (Apr. 1, 2011), translated in CHINADIALOGUE.NET, 
https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/4198-China-s-tainted-rice-trail-2-. 
60  Niu Shuping, China Needs to Cut Use of Fertilizers Says Research, REUTERS (Jan. 14. 2010), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/14/us-china-agriculture-fertiliser-idUSTRE60D20T20100114.  See 
also Yuxuan Li et al., An Analysis of China’s Fertilizer Policies: Impacts on the Industry, Food Security, 
and the Environment, 42 J. OF ENVTL. QUALITY 972, 972-81 (2013) (explaining the potential environmental 
consequences of fertilizer use in China).  
61  Yang Meng, The Damaging Truth About Chinese Fertiliser and Pesticide Use, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK. CHINESE EDITION  (Jul. 9, 2012), translated in CHINADIALOGUE.NET, 
https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/5153. 
62  See J.R. SELF & R.M. WASKOM, NITRATES IN DRINKING WATER (Colo. St. U. Extension ed., Oct. 
2008) http://www.ext.colostate.edu/pubs/crops/00517.html.  
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affecting the water supply of 3.7 million people.63  A chemical spill at a 
fertilizer factory in Changzhi discharged thirty-nine tons of aniline, a 
potential carcinogen, but local officials delayed reporting the accident for 
five days.64  China’s soil pollution problem is endangering public health.  It 
is a problem that must be addressed.  
 
B.  Soil Pollution is Damaging China’s Economy by Slowing Urban 
Development and Threatening Food Security  
 
Due to China’s economic development policy of “pollute first, control 
later” (“xian wuran hou zhili”),65 the collateral damage to the environment 
from development has started to adversely affect its economy.66  The total 
cost of controlling air and water pollution is 5.78% of China’s GDP.67  A 
2005 study estimates that pollution expenses associated with lost labor and 
health care cost the Chinese economy USD 112 billion annually. 68  
Specifically, soil pollution is slowing urban development and threatening 
China’s domestic food supply.   
Soil pollution is particularly damaging to economic development in 
urban areas.  Many former industrial sites in cities have been abandoned 
because of contamination concerns.69  Rural Chinese are migrating to cities 
at unprecedented rates. 70   As migration has occurred, city centers have 
expanded.71  Factories formerly on the city’s edge are now in the middle of 
                                                      
63  David Eimer, 20 Tons of Cadmium Poisoning Vital Chinese River, THE TELEGRAPH (Feb. 2, 2012), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/environment/9053671/20-tons-of-cadmium-poisoning-vital-Chinese-
river.html.   
64  Edward Wong,  Spill in China Underlines Environmental Concerns, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/03/world/asia/spill-in-china-lays-bare-environmental-
concerns.html?pagewanted=all.  
65  Wang, supra note 12, at 198. 
66  The idea that China’s inadequate environmental protection could impede future growth goes back 
to at least 1997.  See Mark Hertsgarrd, Our Real China Problem, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Nov. 1997), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/97nov/china.htm. 
67  WORLD BANK, COST OF POLLUTION IN CHINA: ECONOMIC ESTIMATES OF PHYSICAL DAMAGE 
(2007).  Another study using different metrics found the rate to be lower, at 2.68% of GDP.  Id. 
68  MIT JOINT PROGRAM ON THE SCIENCE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL CHANGE, HEALTH DAMAGES FROM 
AIR POLLUTION IN CHINA (2011). 
69  Zhang Xiang,  Clean up Toxic Brownfields Before China can go Green, SHANGHAI DAILY (Jan. 22, 
2011), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2011-01/22/c_13702537.htm.  
70  In 1949 and 1978, only 7.3% and 17.9% of the total Chinese population lived in urban areas.  By 
2008, China's urbanization rate had reached 45.7%.  Xiao-san Luo et al., Trace Metal Contamination in 
Urban Soils of China, 421 SCI. OF THE TOTAL ENV’T 17, 18 (2011).  Additionally, a draft of the country's 
twelfth Five Year Plan aimed to raise the urbanization rate from 47.5 % in 2010 to 51.5%  by the end of 
2015, with an average annual increase of 4%.  Li Jing, Soil Pollution Poisons More than Farmland, CHINA 
DAILY (March 10, 2011), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/2011-03/10/content_12146168.htm.  
71  WORLD BANK, OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT SITUATION ON BROWNFIELD REMEDIATION AND 
REDEVELOPMENT IN CHINA (Sept. 2010).   
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urban environments while other factories are pushed out of the city 
entirely.72  Out of necessity, former industrial zones are re-classified for 
residential use.73  Between 2001 and 2009, at least 98,000 industrial plants 
were closed and relocated across the country. 74   Many of the industrial 
plants were state-owned factories with high pollution output were built 
during the Great Leap Forward. 75   In normal circumstances, real estate 
developers would covet these centrally located pieces of property.76  Yet, the 
sites have become empty brownfields.77  They have become a roadblock to 
development, both because of pollution problems and because property 
owners and developers are concerned they may be held liable for the health 
effects of that pollution if they develop the land.78   
Although Chinese law requires that soil be analyzed for contaminates 
before large construction projects commence,79 this requirement is generally 
ignored.  For example, in 2006, a housing developer in the city of Wuhan 
was awarded the contract to build near the city.80  A year into construction, 
the site was determined to be the former location of a fertilizer factory and 
the soil to have been heavily contaminated.81  The developer demanded his 
money back and the city of Wuhan paid RMB 120 million  in compensation.  
Remediation, costing RMB 232 million, started in 2011.82  
 Soil pollution does not merely slow the economic development in 
China’s urban environments—it also slows rural Chinese economies by 
contaminating the food supply.  Due to topsoil pollution, China is suffering 
from economic losses in the form of reduced farmland production.83  It is 
                                                      
72  Id.  
73  Yin Pumin, Healing the Land, BEIJING REVIEW (May 7, 2012), 
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/Energy/txt/2012-05/07/content_453010.htm. 
74   Id.  In Beijing, more than 200 polluting enterprises inside the Fourth Ring Road have been 
relocated, leaving nearly eight million square miles of industrial land to be redeveloped.  See WORLD BANK, 
supra note 71, at 4.  
75  See WORLD BANK, supra note 71, at 4. 
76  See generally Kenneth Rapoza, China’s Housing Market Continues to Soar,  FORBES (Sept. 18, 
2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2013/09/18/chinas-housing-market-continues-to-soar/.  
77  A brownfield is “any land or premise which has been previously developed and is not currently 
fully in use, although it may be partially occupied or utilized.  It may also be vacant, derelict, or 
contaminated.”  Sandra Alker et al., The Definition of Brownfield, J. OF ENVTL. PLAN MGM’T, 64, 64-69 
(2000). 
78  See generally WORLD BANK, supra note 71, at 4-6. 
79  Wang Canfa, Chinese Environmental Law Enforcement: Current Deficiencies and Suggested 
Reforms, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 161, 166 (2007). 
80  Bao Xiaodong & Zhang Xinyuan, supra note 38. 
81  Id.  
82  Id.  
83  Li Jing, supra note 70.  
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estimated that in China twelve million tons of grain are contaminated by 
heavy metals each year, causing a loss of RMB 20 billion.84  
China is particularly vulnerable to food shortages.  China must feed 
22% of the world’s population on less than 9% of the world’s cultivated 
land, and that area of land is shrinking.85  Poorer counties in China are 
particularly vulnerable, as food availability is largely determined by local 
food supply.86  Food prices are extremely volatile.  For example, prices rose 
18% between 2008 and 2009.87  Rising food prices have the attention of the 
central government.  In 2011, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao pledged to boost 
food supplies to hold down costs.88  China cannot afford to lose significant 
portions of its domestic crops. A strong policy that ensures polluted soil is 
properly remediated will make more land available for development in urban 
areas and help stabilize China’s food security. 
 
C.  Mass Protests Against Soil Pollution Threaten China’s Social Stability  
 
In addition to causing environmental and economic problems, soil 
pollution is also a source of civil unrest.  Less than 1% of environmental 
disputes are resolved through legal channels.89  Chinese affected by severe 
environmental pollution have increasingly taken to protesting, which poses a 
threat to social stability.90  While environmental protests are a relatively 
                                                      
84  Xu Qi, Facing up to “Invisible Pollution,” CHINA ENVTL. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2006), 
http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/724-Facing-up-to-invisible-pollution-. 
85  Jie Chen, supra note 43, at 2.  For example, China faces tightening grain supplies.  See Grain 
Supply Concern Amid Fast Urbanization, CHINA DAILY (Jan. 15, 2013), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-01/15/content_16121993.htm. 
86  XIAO YUNLAI & NIE FENGYING, WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME, A REPORT ON THE STATUS OF 
CHINA’S FOOD SECURITY 36, (2009) http://www.wfp.org/content/china-report-status-food-security-2009. 
87  Experts Warn Inflation Could Lead to Unrest, VOICE OF AMERICA (Oct. 27, 2009), 
http://www.voanews.com/content/a-13-2008-02-22-voa13-66807847/255756.html.  Inflation was the top 
social concern among Chinese citizens in 2010.  Tom Orlick, Unrest Grows as Economy Booms, WALL ST. 
J. (Sept. 26, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903703604576587070600504108.html. 
88  Bruce Grant,  Wen Vows to Control Chinese Food, Home Prices as Police Head Off Protests, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Feb. 27, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-27/wen-vows-to-control-
chinese-food-home-prices-as-police-head-off-protests.html.  For an example of rising food prices leading to 
protests, see Pinghui Zhuang, Pupils Protest Over Food Price Rises, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Jul. 19, 
2012), http://www.scmp.com/article/731650/pupils-protest-over-food-price-rises.   
89  Feng Jie & Wang Tao, Officials Struggling to Respond to the Year of Environmental Protests, 
SOUTHERN WEEKEND (China) (June 12, 2012), https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/5438-
Officials-struggling-to-respond-to-China-s-year-of-environment-protests-.   
90  See Elaine Kurtenbach, Jinko Solar Holding Company Pledges Toxic Waste Cleanup In China, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 20, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/20/jinko-solar-holding-
company-toxic-waste-cleanup_n_971419.html;  Tania Branigan, Anti-Pollution Protesters Halt 
Construction of Copper Plant in China, THE GUARDIAN (July 3, 2012), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jul/03/china-anti-pollution-protest-copper.   
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recent phenomenon,91 the number of incidents is rising quickly.  In 2005, 
over 50,000 protests occurred due to pollution.92  Since 1996, the number of 
environmental protests in China has grown 29% per year.93   
The environmental protests in China are largely grass-roots responses 
to specific environmental threats.94  Generally, national environmental non-
governmental organizations (“NGOs”) are not involved in these localized 
protests.95  Chinese protest both in response to environmental incidents that 
have already occurred, as when villagers in Shaanxi Province tore down a 
fence and smashed trucks upon learning that lead pollution from a local 
plant had poisoned more than 600 children. 96  They also protest in 
anticipation of future environmental degradation, as when thousands of 
Chinese in Sichuan Province protested the construction of a molybdenum 
copper plant.97  Because the protests are always in response to specific local 
issues, they generally end once the specific problem has been addressed.98  
For example, an environmental protest ended once the polluting facility in 
Shaanxi was closed,99  and the government promised to pay for victims’ 
treatment.100  In Sichuan, protests caused plans to build the copper plant to 
be abandoned.101  In general, once the government takes action, protests stop 
and do not grow into larger movements.102 
                                                      
91  See Feng Jie & Wang Tao, supra note 89.    
 92 Li Fangchao, Environment Issus Addressed More Urgently, CHINA DAILY (May 4, 2006), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2006-05/04/content_582631.htm (quoting Pan Yue, deputy director 
of the State Environmental Protection Administration) ; Oster, supra note 1.  
93  Feng Jie & Wang Tao, supra note 89.  This figure came from Yang Zhaofei, vice-chair of the 
Chinese Society for Environmental Sciences, at a speech to a recent special meeting of the Standing 
Committee of the eleventhNational People’s Congress. 
94  Tong Yanqi distinguishes the grass roots protests of a pollution driven model of environmental 
social movements from the world view model.  The world view model is largely found in countries that 
have reached a level of affluence in which people have post-material values such as a quality of life, which 
includes a clean environment in general.  See Tong Yanqi, Environment Movements in Transitional 
Societies, 37 COMP. POL. 167, 168-69 (2005). 
95  An anonymous environmental NGO leader complained, “we already had too much trouble with 
the government.  If we get involved with these local protests, it will be difficult for us to define ourselves.  
If we are perceived by the government as the black hand behind these protests, we won’t be able to survive.”  
Id. at 181. 
96  Jonathan Watts & Zhang Cui, Chinese Villagers Storm Factory Blamed for Lead Poisoning of 600 
Children, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 17, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/aug/17/china-
lead-factory-protest.   
97  Branigan, supra note 90. 
98  Tong Yanqi, supra note 94, at 183.  
99  Smelter to Close Fully After Poisoning 851 Children With Lead, XINHUA (Aug. 19, 2009), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-08/19/content_11911834.htm.   
100  Watts & Zhang Cui, supra note 96. 
101  Branigan, supra note 90. 
102  Phillip Stalley & Donging Yang, An Emerging Environmental Movement in China?, 186 THE 
CHINA Q. 333, 335-36 (2006). 
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The Chinese government is very concerned about any form of social 
unrest.  The Chinese Communist Party has endorsed the doctrine of the 
“harmonious society” in response to growing inequalities in Chinese 
society.103  The policy aims for a well-off, middle class society with minimal 
social tensions.104  Feasibility reports for large construction projects now 
include “stability assessments” to assess the project’s risk to social 
stability.105  However, the government’s response to social unrest is often 
heavy handed.  In the environmental protests in Zhejiang Province, 
protestors were beaten 106  and imprisoned. 107   Local authorities used 
intimidation and close surveillance to control the area.108  These practices are 
typical of the government’s wei wen strategy of stopping large-scale 
demonstrations by any means necessary, including force.109  If force fails, 
the government will quickly make concessions to keep the movement from 
escalating.110 
Given the severity of China’s pollution problems, the local-level 
environmental protests will not abate anytime soon.  Moreover, Chinese 
attitudes towards pollution are changing.  A recent survey shows that 57% of 
Chinese prioritize protecting the environment, even at the risk of curbing 
economic growth.111  Without reform, environment pollution will continue to 
threaten the government’s goal of social stability.  
                                                      
103  Joseph Kahn, China Makes Commitment to Social Harmony, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/12/world/asia/12china.html?_r=0.  
104  See the People’s Daily definition of “harmonious society,” at: 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90002/92169/92211/6274603.html. The People’s Daily is an organ of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party.  See China Defies Media Cuts and Closures with New 
Newspaper Launch, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 20, 2009), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/apr/20/china-newspaper-launch. 
105  Feng Jie & Wang Tao, supra note 89. 
106  Large Scale Riot Erupts in Huashui Town of Zhejiang Province, THE EPOCH TIMES (Apr. 15, 
2005), http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/5-4-15/27880.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).  
107  Mark Magnier, As China Spews Pollution, Villagers Rise Up, LA TIMES (Sept. 3, 2006), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2006/sep/03/world/fg-enviro3. 
108  Id. 
109  See Harold Thibault, Environmental Activism Gains Foothold in China, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 21, 
2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/aug/21/environment-activists-china-pollution-protest  
(commentary of sociologist Yang Guobin).  
110  Id.  
111  Daniella Yu & Anita Pugliese, Majority of Chinese Prioritize Environment Over Economy, 
GALLUP  (June 8, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/155102/majority-chinese-prioritize-environment-
economy.aspx.  Compare with Stalley & Donging Yang, supra note 102 (explaining that protests in China 
usually stop once the government intervenes). 
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III.  CHINA’S SOIL POLLUTION LAWS ARE VAGUE AND INEFFECTIVE; OTHER 
SOURCES OF LAW FAIL TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEMS OF SOIL 
POLLUTION 
Despite the soil pollution problems outlined above and constitutional 
commitments to environmental protection,112 China lacks effective laws on 
comprehensive soil remediation. 113  In lieu of a law that directly addresses 
soil pollution, existing soil pollution may trigger several discrete, national 
tort and criminal laws, none of which ensure soil pollution is properly 
remediated.  China’s environmental laws fail to prevent soil contamination 
and, when contamination occurs, fail to require remediation because the 
laws are ambiguous, fines are ineffective, and local governments have no 
incentive to enforce the laws.  Other areas of the law that may be used to 
address soil pollution, such as tort and criminal law, are also ineffective. Tort 
law fails because it is extremely difficult for a private citizen to bring suit; 
criminal laws addressing soil pollution are rarely invoked. 
A. National Environmental Law Principles Have Not Been Transformed 
Into Regulations  
China lacks a national law making soil pollution remediation 
compulsory and lacks national standards for surveying and assessing risk of 
polluted sites. 114   However, two national laws do make reference to 
contaminated sites and put forth guiding principles of regulation: The Law 
of the People’s Republic of China on Prevention and Control of 
Environmental Pollution by Solid Waste (“Solid Waste Law”) and the 
Environmental Protection Law of People’s Republic of China 
(“Environmental Protection Law”).115  While these two laws provide guiding 
principles for soil remediation, the laws are ineffective because the 
principles have not been made into substantive regulations.   
The Solid Waste Law and the Environmental Protection Law contain 
provisions for the treatment of contaminants.  Under the law, the 
                                                      
112  In broad terms, the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China provides that the state is 
responsible for protecting the environment and preventing the spread of pollution.  See XIANFA art. 26 
(1982) (“The state protects and improves the living environment and the ecological environment, and 
prevents and controls pollution and other public hazards.”). 
113  Wang Jin & Yan Houfu, supra note 22, at 496. 
114  Bao Xiaodong & Zhang Xinyuan, supra note 38. 
115  See MCELWEE, supra note 28.  In China’s hierarchy of laws, “basic law” enacted by the National 
People’s Congress is at the top.  Both of these laws were enacted by the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress and are thus not basic laws.  No environmental law has been enacted by the full 
National People’s Congress.  
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environmental protection departments may order facilities that have failed to 
treat hazardous waste to begin treating waste in accordance with relevant 
provisions within a specified period of time.116  If an entity fails to do so, it 
may be required to have a third party treat the hazardous waste at the entity’s 
expense.117  Moreover, entities that cause severe environmental pollution are 
required to take measures to eliminate or reduce the danger of the pollution, 
promptly inform anyone that may be harmed, and report the pollution to the 
environmental protection department of the local people's government at or 
above the county level and other relevant departments. 118   A polluting 
enterprise is obligated to eliminate the hazard and compensate victims for 
direct losses.119   
Both laws obligate the government to remedy soil pollution.  Under 
the Solid Waste Law, the government must take measures to eliminate or 
reduce the danger when severe environmental pollution threatens the lives 
and property of people. If necessary, the government may stop operations 
that have caused or may cause pollution accidents. 120   Under the 
Environmental Protection Law, if life or property is endangered by severe 
environmental pollution, the department of environmental protection must 
report to the local people’s government, and the government remove or 
alleviate the hazard.121  
While seemingly well-intentioned, the laws are more akin to policy 
statements than substantive legal requirements. 122   For example, for the 
                                                      
116  Yufang He Kongzhi Guti Feiwu Wuran Huanjin (固体废物污染环境防治法) [The Prevention 
and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Waste Law of the People’s Republic of China]  
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Congress, Oct. 30, 1995, effective Apr. 1, 
2005), art. 55 (China). 
117  Id. 
118  Id. at art. 63.  The Environmental Protection Law contains a similar provision, but appears to have 
a lower threshold, applying to mere accidents of pollution, stating:  “[a]ny unit that, as a result of an 
accident or any other exigency, has caused or threatens to cause an accident of pollution, must promptly 
take measures to prevent and control the pollution hazards, make the situation known to such units and 
inhabitants as are likely to be endangered by such hazards.”  Id. at art. 31. 
119  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Baohu Fa (中华人民共和国环境保护法) 
[Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong, Dec. 26, 1989, effective Dec. 26, 1989), art. 41 (China).  
120  Yufang He Kongzhi Guti Feiwu Wuran Huanjin (固体废物污染环境防治法) [The Prevention 
and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Waste Law of the People’s Republic of China]  
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Congress, Oct. 30, 1995, effective Apr. 1, 
2005), art. 64 (China). 
121  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Baohu Fa (中华人民共和国环境保护法) 
[Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong, Dec. 26, 1989, effective Dec. 26, 1989), art. 32 (China).   
122  Wang, supra note 12, at 203.  For example, the Solid Waste Law provides that the State shall: 
encourage and support the adoption of beneficial measures of centralized treatment of solid wastes, 
encourage and support scientific research, encourage the entities and individuals to purchase and use 
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treatment of hazardous waste, the “relevant provisions” and “specified 
periods of time” of Article 55 of the Solid Waste Law are never defined.123  
Similarly, the measures the government is required to take to remove or 
alleviate hazards under Article 32 of the Environmental Protection Law are 
never specified.   
Normally, the State Council and the MEP would implement 
regulations to enforce these principles, 124  but no regulations have been 
implemented.125  When legislation requires, as it does here, the State Council 
is authorized to promulgate administrative regulations.126  Relevant State 
Council agencies create regulations pursuant to the national law.127  These 
regulations have the force of law. 128   The MEP has adopted a single 
“directive” specifically for soil remediation.129  The Directive on Completing 
Environmental Pollution Prevention and Control When Enterprises Move, 
states that "the company which inherits the debts and rights (of the polluter) 
should shoulder the responsibility for providing financial assistance to 
restore the productivity of polluted land."130  However, the directive fails to 
clarify the punishment for violators 131  and has remained largely 
ineffective. 132   The ambiguities are the result of compromises made in 
                                                                                                                                                              
renewable products and reusable products, encourage scientific research and production institutions to do 
research on and manufacture plastic-sheet covering and packages of commodities, and encourage a legal 
service agency to offer legal aids to the victims of suits of environmental pollution by solid wastes.  Yufang 
He Kongzhi Guti Feiwu Wuran Huanjin (固体废物污染环境防治法) [The Prevention and Control of 
Environmental Pollution by Solid Waste Law of the People’s Republic of China]  (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Congress, Oct. 30, 1995, effective Apr. 1, 2005), art. 3, 6, 7, 17, and 
84 (China). 
123  See Yufang He Kongzhi Guti Feiwu Wuran Huanjin (固体废物污染环境防治法) [The 
Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Waste Law of the People’s Republic of China]  
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Congress, Oct. 30, 1995, effective Apr. 1, 
2005), art. 55 (China). 
124  MCELWEE, supra note 28, at 83.  
125  INGA CALDWELL & XINYU WANG, VERMONT LAW SCHOOL, A HIDDEN PROBLEM: CHINA’S 
CONTAMINATED SITE SOIL POLLUTION CRISIS 4 (2011), 
http://www.vermontlaw.edu/Documents/China%20Program/CaldwellWangPaper3.pdf.   
126  Per XIANFA art. 89(1), the State Council has the power to “adopt administrative measures, enact 
administrative rules and regulations, and issue decisions and orders in accordance with the Constitution and 
statutes.”  Some scholars posit that this power makes the State Council the most important organ of state 
power.  As most national legislation is extremely general, the State Council has the ability to essentially re-
write the laws.  MCELWEE, supra note 28. 
127  MCELWEE, supra note 28, at 78. 
128 MA XIAOYANG & LEONARDO ORTOLANO, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN CHINA: INSTITUTIONS, 
ENFORCEMENT, AND COMPLIANCE 15 (2000). 
129  Caldwell & Xinyu Wang, supra note 125, at 14.  
130  Wu Jiao, Govt Targets Land Pollution to Ensure Food Security, CHINA DAILY (June 20, 2008), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-06/20/content_6779537.htm. 
131  See id.   
132  It is not uncommon for agencies responsible for drafting environmental assessments of 
construction projects to falsify their reports in order to benefit the future polluter.  Wang Canfa, supra note 
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drafting and concerns over economic growth.133  Many counties and towns 
continue to dispose of waste without any treatment.134   
 
B.  China’s Environmental Laws are Largely Enforced by Local Agencies, 
Which are Controlled by Local Governments and Prevented from 
Effectively Enforcing Environmental Regulations 
 
Ambiguities in the national law contribute to the failure of the law in a 
formalistic sense, but enforcement of the law brings an additional set of 
problems.  The MEP is part of the central government’s State Council and is 
replicated as Environmental Protection Bureaus (“EPBs”) at each 
subsequent lower level of local government—provincial, city, district, 
county, and town.135  Local EPBs are agencies in the local government; 
EPBs are not part of the central government.  Local EPBs are charged with 
actually implementing the MEP’s regulations,136 but they serve competing 
masters.  The MEP and provincial level EPBs promulgate regulations and 
policies for local EPBs.137  However, in all cases, the local government 
appoints the local EPB’s director138  and provides their annual budget.139  
Because local governments control each local EPB’s budgets, local 
governments are the more powerful interest.140   
Many officials in local governments are more concerned with GDP 
than the environment, both in order to raise sufficient revenue for their 
government and out of self-interest.  China divides revenue and expenditures 
among central and local governments.141  The central government collects a 
                                                                                                                                                              
79, at 166-67.  Professor Wang cites one example in which the EIA report stated the distance between the 
proposed plant and a residential district was 400 meters, when it was actually 20 meters. 
133  Wang, supra note 12, at 204 (reporting that Zou Shengxian, director of the State Environmental 
Protection Administration, said “[l]ocal protectionism has resulted in rampant violation of the 
environment.”).  
134  Wang Canfa, supra note 79, at 170.   
135  See Abigail Jahiel, The Organization of Environmental Protection in China, 156 THE CHINA Q. 
757, 758-59 (Dec. 1998).   
136  The MEP only exercises direct oversight in rare instances, such as large construction projects and 
cross-provincial pollution prevention.  See MCELWEE, supra note 28, at 113-18.  
137  The hierarchy of political power is generally straightforward: a government office of lesser rank 
has no authority to compel compliance from offices of higher rank.  Thus, a provincial level EPB can make 
demands on the city or county EPBs, but not vice versa.  But sometimes, the hierarchy is unclear.  
Provinces have the same rank as ministries.  As such, the MEP, a ministry, cannot command a province to 
comply with one of its regulations, it can only recommend that it comply.  See Jahiel, supra note 135, at 
765 n.18.  
138  MCELWEE, supra note 28, at 115. 
139  The local government also determines increases in personnel and even allocation of such resources 
as cars, office buildings and employee housing.  Jahiel, supra note 135, at 759. 
140  Id.  
141  Wang Jin & Yan Houfu, supra note 22, at 496. 
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larger portion of the taxes, but local governments are primarily responsible 
for public services.142  To improve public services under this scheme, local 
officials must pursue policies that promote rapid economic growth.143  Many 
environmental violators are major taxpayers supporting the local 
government. 144  Large fines may also divert money from the local 
community.145  Reliant on the polluters’ contributions, local governments 
instruct courts not to implement environmental penalties.146  In the Rongping 
Factory case described in the introduction,147 the polluting chemical factory 
accounted for 25% of the county’s income.148  The factory’s arrival also 
doubled the town’s population.149   
Local officials also pursue economic development at the expense of 
environmental considerations out of self-interest.  Their job performance is 
primarily evaluated on the growth of the local economy’s GDP. 150  
Conversely, environmental performance constitutes only a small part of the 
evaluation. 151   Party members are evaluated every five years, which 
contributes to an emphasis on quick, short-term performance.152  At best, 
environmental performance does not affect the local economy. At worst, it 
slows economic growth.  Because of the importance of the GDP, local 
governments tend to take short-term actions to quickly develop the 
economy.153 
 
C.  Fines Levied by Local Environmental Departments are Ineffective 
Because Fines are Rarely Awarded and Often the Cost of the Fine is 
Lower than the Cost of Compliance  
 
The environmental protection department of local governments may 
levy fines against polluting entities.  Fines can result from a number of acts 
and omissions.  Entities can be fined for failing to declare solid wastes or 
engaging in deception when declaring solid or hazardous waste.154  They can 
                                                      
142  Id. 
143  Id. 
144  Id. at 502 n.6.  
145  Wang Canfa, supra note 79, at 169.  
146  Wang Jin & Yan Houfu, supra note 22, at 499 n.6. 
147  See supra Part I.  
148  Wang Canfa, supra note 79, at 169.  
149  Oster, supra note 1. 
150  Wang Canfa, supra note 79, at 171. 
151  Wang Jin & Yan Houfu, supra note 22, at 495-96.  
        152   See Gang Guo, China’s Local Political Budget Cycles, 53 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 621, 624 (2009). 
153  Wang Canfa, supra note 79, at 171. 
154  See Yufang He Kongzhi Guti Feiwu Wuran Huanjin (预防和控制固体废物污染环境) [The 
Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Wastes Law of the People’s Republic of 
188 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 23 NO. 1 
 
be fined for failing to adopt precautionary measures to prevent pollution by 
hazardous waste. 155   Entities can be fined for closing, leaving idle, or 
dismantling without permission equipment intended to prevent and control 
solid or hazardous waste,156 and for using sites or equipment previously 
contaminated with hazardous waste without treatment.157  
While the outward objective of fines is to discourage pollution,158 
fines are simply too low at present to deter environmental violations.  Guilty 
parties find it more cost-effective to pay the fine than correct violations.159  
In theory, polluting facilities may be fined RMB 1,000,000 for dumping 
imported waste from abroad160 and for severe environmental accidents.161  In 
practice, fines do not exceed RMB 200,000.162  The cost of breaking the law 
can be just 10% of the cost of compliance.163  While facilities that discharge 
pollutants above proscribed standards should face administrative sanctions, 
when the standards are enforced, the polluting facility is typically ordered to 
reduce their discharge flow by a specified time rather than pay a fine.164  
Instead of unilaterally levying fines against polluting facilities, local 
environmental bureaus often negotiate with the polluting facility,165 settling 
on a fine that is far below both the damages caused by the pollution and the 
                                                                                                                                                              
China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 2004, effective Apr. 1, 2005), 
art. 68(1) & 75(1) (China);  see also Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Baohu Fa (中华人民共和国
环境保护法) [Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong, Dec. 26, 1989, effective Dec. 26, 1989), art. 35(2)-(3) (China).  
155  Yufang He Kongzhi Guti Feiwu Wuran Huanjin (预防和控制固体废物污染环境) [The 
Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Wastes Law of  the People’s Republic of 
China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 2004, effective Apr. 1, 2005), 
art. 75(11) (China). 
156  Id. at art. 68(4), 75(3). 
157  Id. at art. 75(10). 
158  See generally, Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of 
Environmental Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181 (1998). 
159  Wang Jin & Yan Houfu, supra note 22, at 497. 
160  Yufang He Kongzhi Guti Feiwu Wuran Huanjin (预防和控制固体废物污染环境) [The 
Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Wastes Law of the People’s Republic of 
China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 2004, effective Apr. 1, 2005), 
art. 78 (China).  
161  Id. at art. 82. 
162  Michael Faure & Hao Zhang,  Environmental Criminal law in China: A Critical Analysis,  41 
ENVTL. LAW REP. 10,024, 10,037 (2011). 
163  Dong Hongwei, Why Does Environmental Compliance Cost More than Penalty?—A legal 
Analysis on Environmental Acts of Enterprises in China, 1 FRONTIER ENVTL. SCI. OF ENGINEERING 434, 
435 (2007).  
164  MCELWEE, supra note 28, at 54. 
165  The local EPB has this power pursuant to the Environmental Protection Law.  See Yufang He 
Kongzhi Guti Feiwu Wuran Huanjin (固体废物污染环境防治法) [The Prevention and Control of 
Environmental Pollution by Solid Waste Law of the People’s Republic of China]  (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Congress, Oct. 30, 1995, effective Apr. 1, 2005), art. 55 (China). 
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expense of pollution control.166  Not only is polluting often cheaper than 
compliance, but polluting enterprises often view these fines as entitling them 
to take unlawful action.167 
Moreover, if the polluting entity refuses to pay a fine, environmental 
departments are unable to take direct measures to compel payment and 
instead must appeal to the courts for enforcement.168  Unfortunately, the 
courts do not cooperate with the enforcement of fines.169  In addition, the 
environmental department is required to pay an initial “implementation fee” 
to the courts.170  This fee is calculated by the amount of the penalty.171  Most 
fees are very low, around RMB 50, and are not of interest to the courts.172  
Administrative fines are the prevailing mechanism China uses to 
punish those who violate environmental laws.173   These fines are rarely 
enforced and ineffective when enforced.  Unfortunately, there is little 
government initiative to change this faulty scheme.174   
 
D.  Polluters May be Civilly Liable but it is Extremely Difficult for 
Citizens to Bring Cases  
 
Civil suits, in which private citizens attempt to enforce environmental 
laws through litigation, are another means of forcing polluting entities to 
remediate polluted soil and prevent soil pollution in general.  Two national 
laws provide a cause of action for environmental tort litigation.  The 
                                                      
166  Stefanie Beyer,  Environmental Law and Policy in the People’s Republic of China,  5(1) CHINESE 
J. OF INT’L L., 185, 207 (2006). 
167  Id. at 207-08.  For a striking account of a polluting enterprise paying compensation to a village to 
continue to pollute, with no intent of remediation, see Anna Lora-Wainwright, et. al., Learning to Live with 
Pollution: The Making of Environmental Subjects in a Chinese Industrialized Village, 68 THE CHINA J. 106, 
106-24 (2012).   
168  Zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó xíngzhèng sùsòng fǎ (中华人民共和国行政诉讼法) 
[Administrative Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
of the Nat’l People’s Congress, April 4, 1989, effective Oct. 1, 1990), art. 66 (China).  See also Alex Wang, 
Environmental Courts and Public Interest Litigation in China, 43 CHINESE LAW AND GOV’T 4, 6 (2010); 
Wang Jin & Yan Houfu, supra note 22, at 499.  
169  Wang Jin & Yan Houfu, supra note 22, at 499. 
170  Id. at 499, n.5.  
171  The “implementation fee” is RMB 50 if the penalty is below RMB 10,000.  If the penalty is more 
than RMB 10,000 but less than RMB 500,000, the “implementation fee” will be 0.5% of that amount.  If 
the penalty is more than RMB 500,000, the “implementation fee” will be 0.1% of that amount.  About 90% 
of the environmental penalties in China are less than RMB 20,000.  Id. at 500-01. 
172  Id. at 499. 
173  Administrative fines are more common than other civil or criminal penalties.  Dong Hongwei, 
supra note 163.  
174  Wang Jin & Yan Houfu, supra note 22, at 497-98 (noting that while amending the Law on the 
Prevention and Control of Water Pollution in 2007, many scholars supported the proposition to establish a 
“daily penalty” in the law that would raise the cost of violations.  However, the Legislature did not adopt 
the penalty because doing so would increase the burden on enterprises and harm economic development.) 
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Environmental Protection Law holds that “a unit that has caused an 
environmental pollution hazard shall . . . make compensation to the unit or 
individual that suffered direct losses.”175   The Tort Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (“Tort Law of China”) requires “where any harm is 
caused by environmental pollution, the polluter shall assume the tort 
liability.”176  On its face, the tort law appears favorable to pollution victims 
because of the generous liability provisions and because the defendant 
carries the burden of proof.  In practice, courts frequently mis-apply the law, 
victims are unaware of statute of limitations, local interests protect polluters, 
and victims have difficulty enforcing judgments.  
The tort law seems favorable to pollution victims because suspected 
tort offenders in China are liable jointly and severally177 and China has “no 
fault” liability for pollution violations.178  Under joint and several liability in 
China, if two or more parties engage in conduct that hurts a third party, but 
the third party is unable to establish which party is responsible for all the 
specific damage, the victim can hold all the parties liable or instead choose 
to hold only one party liable.179  This is important in scenarios where a new 
enterprise has replaced an old enterprise, and it cannot be determined which 
enterprise is primarily responsible for the soil pollution.180  Moreover, China 
has “no fault” liability, meaning that pollution victims do not need to show 
that the polluter violated a law or emission standards.181  Simply being in 
                                                      
175  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Baohu Fa (中华人民共和国环境保护法) 
[Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong, Dec. 26, 1989, effective Dec. 26, 1989), art. 41 (China).  
176  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qinquan Zeren Fa (中华人民共和国侵权责任法) [Tort Law of 
the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009, 
effective July 1, 2010), art. 65 (China), available at http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2009-
12/26/content_1497435.htm.  English translation available at 
http://www.procedurallaw.cn/english/law/201001/t20100110_300173.html.   
177  Id. at art. 8.  
178 Wang, supra note 12, at 208.  
179  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qinquan Zeren Fa (中华人民共和国侵权责任法) [Tort Law of 
the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009, 
effective July 1, 2010), art. 8, 10, 68 (China), available at http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2009-
12/26/content_1497435.htm.  English translation available at 
http://www.procedurallaw.cn/english/law/201001/t20100110_300173.html.  
180  See YUYONG GONG, THE WORLD BANK, INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE IN POLICY AND 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS FOR BROWNFIELD SITE MANAGEMENT 3-4 (2010). 
181  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Baohu Fa (中华人民共和国环境保护法) 
[Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong, Dec. 26, 1989, effective Dec. 26, 1989), art. 41 (China).  Wang notes that the 
language “in violation of state principles” under General Principles, art. 124, seems to indicate a 
requirement for showing some violation of the law, but that scholars agree Environmental Protection Law 
Article 41 controls because the specific supersedes the general, and the newer statute supersedes the older.  
See Wang, supra note 12, at 208. 
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compliance with the law is not enough to shield pollution producing 
enterprises from civil liability.  
Pollution victims also have an advantage because the burden of proof 
lies with the polluting defendant.182  The polluting entity assumes the burden 
to prove that it is not liable, its liability could be mitigated, or that there is no 
causation between its conduct and the harm.183  The Supreme People’s Court 
has confirmed that the burden of proof lies with the defendant.184  Despite 
the Supreme People’s Court’s position, many courts still require the 
pollution victims to show causation, 185  or require the victims to show 
causation before shifting the burden to the defendant.186   
While the liability and burden of proof provisions favor pollution 
victims, it is nevertheless extremely difficult for pollution victims to win in 
tort litigation.  Petitioners must file their claim within three years of 
becoming aware of pollution related loses.187  Yet in many cases, pollution 
victims’ first instinct is not to file a suit but to bring the problem to the 
attention of local government authorities.188  Polluting enterprises engage in 
stalling tactics, by which the enterprise enters into negotiations with the 
                                                      
182  Yufang He Kongzhi Guti Feiwu Wuran Huanjin (预防和控制固体废物污染环境) [The 
Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Wastes Law of the People’s Republic of 
China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 2004, effective Apr. 1, 2005), 
art. 86 (China); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qinquan Zeren Fa (中华人民共和国侵权责任法) [Tort 
Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 
26, 2009, effective July 1, 2010), art. 66 (China), available at http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2009-
12/26/content_1497435.htm.  English translation available at 
http://www.procedurallaw.cn/english/law/201001/t20100110_300173.html.  
183  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qinquan Zeren Fa (中华人民共和国侵权责任法) [Tort Law of 
the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009, 
effective July 1, 2010), art. 66 (China), available at http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2009-
12/26/content_1497435.htm.  English translation available at 
http://www.procedurallaw.cn/english/law/201001/t20100110_300173.html.   
184  See MCELWEE, supra note 28, at 256.  In Hebei, a Korean manufacturer was held liable for the 
death of a neighbor because the manufacturer could not prove it was not the cause of the fatal cancer.  
Though the court appeared to award reduced damages because no causal connection between the pollution 
and the cancer was shown, this remains an area of potential concern for companies operating in China.  See 
id. at 255-56 (citing Qie Jianrong, Pollution Victim Li Yujun Prevails in Claim for Cancer Death, LEGAL 
DAILY, (July 7, 2009), http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/bm/2009-07/08/content_1119585.htm).  
185  Wang, supra note 12, at 209. 
186  Adam Moser & Tseming Yang, Environmental Tort Litigation in China, 41 ENVTL. LAW REP. 
10895, 10897 (2011).  
187  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Baohu Fa (中华人民共和国环境保护法) 
[Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong, Dec. 26, 1989), art. 42 (China).  
188  Benjamin van Rooij, People vs. Pollution: Understanding Citizen Action Against Pollution in 
China, 19 J. OF CONTEMP. CHINA 55, 63 (2010). 
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citizens 189  with no intent of executing the agreement and subsequently 
forcing the citizens to pursue an alternative course of action.190   
To bring suit, plaintiffs must pay the court an “acceptance fee,” which 
is a percentage of relief requested.191  The fees can be low, RMB 50  for 
cases involving less than RMB 10,000, but fees quickly escalate if more 
relief is requested.192  These acceptance fees act as a deterrent on citizens 
trying to bring suit. 193   Indigent plaintiffs can seek a waiver for the 
acceptance fee, but waiving the fee is at the court’s discretion.  Some courts 
rely on fees to support their operational budget,194 and some courts deny 
waivers to a plaintiff that the court believes is a “troublemaker.”195 
Once in court, plaintiffs are not required by law to show causation, but 
they must show damages.196   In many instances, damage claims require 
technical expertise that plaintiffs simply do not have; thus, the plaintiffs 
must bring in outside experts.197  It can be very difficult for plaintiffs to 
show damages from one-time pollution violations, because at the time of the 
violation a victim may not have anticipated needing evidence of damages for 
a later court case.198  In addition, judges rarely have environmental expertise 
and have difficulty weighing different expert opinions to find a resolution.199   
The same local protectionist interests that affect agency enforcement 
of environmental laws are also at play in the courtroom. 200   Local 
governments control judicial appointments and finance local courts.201 In 
deciding civil lawsuits, local courts often take “overall interests” into 
consideration. 202   These “overall interests” are all the potential at-large 
interests that may be affected by the decision, not just the interests of the 
                                                      
189  These negotiations may be moderated by the local EPB, and the bureaus may help determine who 
is liable.  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Baohu Fa (中华人民共和国环境保护法) 
[Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong, Dec. 26, 1989, effective Dec. 26, 1989), art. 41 (China).   Administrative mediations 
settle the majority of pollution claims in China, and each EPB may have its own procedures.  MCELWEE 
supra note 28, at 254. 
190  van Rooij, supra note 188, at 74.  
191  Wang, supra note 12, at 211. 
192  The acceptance fees can range from 0.5 % of requested compensation for requested compensation 
of over RMB 200 million, to 2.5% for requested compensation between RMB 10,000 and 1 million.  
Rachel Stern, From Dispute to Decision: Suing Polluters in China, 206 THE CHINA Q. 294, 300 (2011). 
193  Moser & Tseming Yang, supra note 186, at 10897. 
194  Id. 
195  Stern, supra note 192, at 300. 
196  Moser & Tseming Yang, supra note 186, at 10898. 
197  Id. at 10899. 
198  van Rooij, supra note 188, at 68.  
199  Moser & Tseming Yang, supra note 186, at 10989.   
200  See supra Part III.B.  
201  Cai Dingjian, Development of Chinese Legal, 11 CULTURAL DYNAMICS 135, 161 (1999).  
202  Moser & Tseming Yang, supra note 186, at 10896. 
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parties to the dispute.203  Often consideration of the “overall interests” means 
a focus on protecting social stability, which entails preserving the status 
quo 204  and not creating or setting a new precedent for environmental 
remediation.205   
Even when plaintiffs succeed at trial, it is often difficult to enforce 
compliance with the decision.  Although the Environmental Protection Law 
states that a polluting unit “shall have the obligation to eliminate” the 
pollution hazard,206 indicating courts could require soil remediation, courts 
rarely do so, instead opting for monetary compensation.207  Yet enforcing 
monetary judgments is difficult.  Officials may respond to requests for 
enforcement of non-local judgments by ignoring the law or inventing 
expenses to deduct a percentage from the award.208   Officials may also 
conspire with the local government to hide assets.209  Additionally, some 
courts only assist in the enforcement of judgments from jurisdictions in 
which their own decisions are enforced.210  
Environmental tort litigation is increasingly popular as a potential 
source of relief for the victims of environmental pollution,211 and there have 
been some recent successful cases brought by private citizens against 
polluting industries.212  Nevertheless, institutional barriers to bringing and 
successfully executing an environmental tort claim are such that 
environmental torts do not sufficiently deter soil polluters.  Consequently, 
environmental tort litigation is not a viable alternative to a national soil 
remediation policy.   
 
                                                      
203  Id.  
204  Id.  
205  For a description of the mechanisms at play that discourage judges from making waves, including 
liability for legal error, see generally Carl Minzer, Judicial Disciplinary Systems for Incorrectly Decided 
Cases: The Imperial Chinese Heritage Lives On, 39 N.M. L. REV. 63 (2009).   
206  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Baohu Fa (中华人民共和国环境保护法) 
[Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong, Dec. 26, 1989, effective Dec. 26, 1989). 
207  Moser & Tseming Yang, supra note 186, at 10897.  For an example of the difficulties of 
compliance in general, even with the support of local officials, consider the incident in Yangzhoug City, 
Hunan Province.  Local officials, including delegates of the local National People’s Congress, stormed a 
smelter that had refused to stop production and destroyed the plant’s furnaces with three tons of dynamite.  
See Ouyang Hongliang & Zhang Ruidan, Heavy Metal Warfare, CAIJING (Aug. 11, 2011), 
http://english.caijing.com.cn/2009-08-11/110222718.html.  
208  Cai Dingjian, supra note 201, at 146-50. 
209  Id. 
210  Id. at 150.  
211  In 2006, there were 616,122 environmental complaints, a 60% increase from 2001.  See Stern, 
supra note 192, at 295.  
212  See supra Part I. 
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E.  Polluters May be Held Criminally Liable, but Liability is Generally 
Reserved for Well-Publicized Cases 
 
The Solid Waste Law, 213  Environmental Protection Law, 214  and 
Criminal Law215 all contain criminal liability provisions for environmental 
abuses.  Yet the language of the laws is too ambiguous and penalties are too 
infrequently enforced for the laws to be effective deterrents.   
The Solid Waste Law and the Environmental Protection Law do not 
define environmental crimes or contain specific sanctions.216   The Solid 
Waste Law states that if the act constitutes a crime, the perpetrator shall be 
subject to criminal liability.217  The Environmental Protection Law states that 
if a violation of law causes a serious environmental pollution accident, 
leading to heavy losses of property, human injury, or death, then the person 
directly responsible shall be investigated for criminal responsibility.218  The 
party held responsible is not usually the director of the polluting enterprise, 
but rather a lower level employee.219 
The Criminal Law sets out a maximum prison sentence of seven 
years.220 The requisite “serious consequences” for environmental pollution 
accidents is a relatively low threshold.221  Traditionally, criminal sanctions in 
                                                      
213  Yufang He Kongzhi Guti Feiwu Wuran Huanjin (预防和控制固体废物污染环境) [The 
Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Wastes Law of the People’s Republic of 
China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 2004, effective Apr. 1, 2005) 
(China).  
214  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Baohu Fa (中华人民共和国环境保护法) 
[Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 1989, effective Dec. 26, 1989) (China). 
215  Zhōngguó rénmín gònghéguó xíngfǎ (中国人民共和国刑法) [Criminal Law of the People’s 
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s  Cong., July 1, 1979, 
effective March 14, 1997), art. 338.  
216  MCELWEE, supra note 28, at 248. 
217  Yufang He Kongzhi Guti Feiwu Wuran Huanjin (预防和控制固体废物污染环境) [The 
Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Wastes Law of the People’s Republic of 
China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 2004, effective Apr. 1, 2005), 
art. 78, 83 (China) (governing dumping, piling up, treating, and importing solid waste from abroad and the 
collection, storage, utilization, or treatment of hazardous waste).  
218  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Baohu Fa (中华人民共和国环境保护法) 
[Environmental     Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong, Dec. 26, 1989, effective Dec. 26, 1989), art. 49 (China). 
219  For lack of Chinese criminal sanctions for executives and managers, see Jeffrey M. Bellamy, 
Putting the Boss Behind Bars: Using Criminal Sanctions Against Executives Who Pollute – What China 
Could Learn From the United States, 13 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 579 (2002). 
220  Zhōngguó rénmín gònghéguó xíngfǎ (中国人民共和国刑法) [Criminal Law of the People’s 
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s  Cong., July 1, 1979, 
effective March 14, 1997), art. 338. 
221  MCELWEE , supra note 28, at 250.  See also Zui Gao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Huajing 
Wuran Zingshi Anjian Juti Zingyong Falu Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi (最高人民法院审理环境污染刑事案
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the environmental context are reserved for large, well-publicized incidents 
and are not imposed in less-publicized incidents.222  Even when pollution 
qualifies as a crime, violators are more likely to receive administrative 
penalties in the form of fines223 than criminal punishment.224 Between 1997 
and 2003, of the 387 pollution accidents that would have constituted a crime, 
only 20 involved criminal prosecutions.225  The problem seems to be a lack 
of will.  
Because of the inadequacy of environmental criminal law, prosecutors 
may choose to pursue different tactics for extreme cases.  The Biaoxin 
Chemical Company was held responsible for illegally discharging toxic 
chemicals that left one million people in Jiangsu Province without water.226  
Biaoxin’s chairman was convicted of spreading poison in violation of 
Criminal Law Article 115.227  Article 115 allows graver penalties, including 
the death penalty.228  Though an interesting example of a unique strategy, it 
is one that has not been frequently utilized. 229   Because criminal 
prosecutions for environmental violations are rare, they do not deter  crimes 
against the environment.  
IV.  THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD DEVELOP A COMPREHENSIVE 
REMEDIATION SCHEME 
As outlined above, China lacks a clear soil pollution remediation 
policy. The government’s failure to address soil pollution has led to 
environmental, economic, and social problems that will only worsen if the 
problem is not addressed.  Fortunately for China, it does not have to re-
invent the wheel.  China can draw on experiences of developed countries to 
create an efficient and cost-effective solution.  China’s central government 
should consider the problems that other countries’ soil remediation programs 
faced in order to anticipate likely problems in its own program.  Of course, it 
                                                                                                                                                              
件的解释) [Supreme People’s Court Interpretation of the Trial of Criminal Cases of Environmental 
Pollution] (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., effective July 28, 2006) (China).  Serious consequences for 
violating this law include property losses of at least RMB 300,000, death of one or more people, or light 
wounds to not fewer than ten people.   
222  MCELWEE, supra note 28, at 251.  
223  For the failure of fines, see supra Part III.C.  
224  Wang Canfa, supra note 79, at 168.  
225  Id.; MCELWEE, supra note 28, at 251-52.  
226  MCELWEE, supra note 28, at 252. 
227  Id.  
228  Zhōngguó rénmín gònghéguó xíngfǎ (中国人民共和国刑法) [Criminal Law of the People’s 
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s  Cong., July 1, 1979, 
effective March 14, 1997), art. 115. 
229  MCELWEE, supra note 28, at 252. 
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would be unrealistic to expect policies directly transplanted from foreign 
countries to work in China.  Any remediation policy China adopts must 
consider specific problems in China, particularly in the area of enforcement. 
The central government should develop a remediation scheme that evaluates 
the degree of remediation necessary, establishes channels for funding, offers 
promotion targets to officials, and promotes public participation.   
A.  A New Remediation Framework Should Include Standards of Risk 
Assessment to Evaluate the Degree of Necessary Remediation  
A policy requiring full soil remediation is not feasible in China.  
Treating soil for pollutants is very expensive, especially if the goal is to 
purify the soil entirely.230  This is an area where China can learn from the 
mistakes of other countries.  For example, in the United States, during the 
early stages of the United States’ Superfund program, the small number of 
initial soil remediation sites went over budget and cost the program large 
amounts of money.231  Similarly, the Netherlands’ initial soil remediation 
program required all projects to be remediated to the same high standard, but 
the program proved unsustainable due to the heavy expenses it incurred.232  
Given the extent of China’s soil pollution problem, if China sets “complete 
remediation” as its goal, the program would experience the same financial 
setbacks experienced in the United States and the Netherlands.  China can 
also consider how other countries’ effectively addressed or resolved those 
problems.  The Netherlands adopted a successful risk-based approach to soil 
remediation. 233   With the risk-based approach, the site’s future use is 
considered to determine to what extent remediation is necessary.234  The 
Dutch system includes target values, the degree the soil should be free of 
contaminants based on the anticipated use of the land, and intervention 
values, which are based on the current risk-level the soil pollution carries.235  
For example, sites in urban areas that will eventually support residential or 
commercial buildings receive more extensive remediation, whereas rural 
sites receive less remediation. 
                                                      
230  YUYANG GONG, supra note 180, at 5.  
231 Id.; Mark Jaffe, Superfund Cleanup Becomes A Bureacratic Quagmire, PHILA. INQUIRER (Aug. 17, 
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234  YUYANG GONG, supra note 180, at 35. 
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Contaminated soil lies within China’s urban and rural areas. 236  
Instead of implementing a program that requires the same remediation 
standards regardless of how the land will be used, China should develop a 
policy that involves a risk-based analysis.  A risk-based system can reduce 
the cost and time of remediation.  
 
B.  A New Remediation Framework Should Include Targets for 
Government Officials to Ensure the Policy is Implemented  
 
Environmental policy implementation is extremely difficult in China.  
Much of the difficulty lies in the fact that implementation is left to the local 
governments and the local governments are largely concerned with 
developing the local economy.237  This is because their tax base is supported 
by the local economy and because the officials are evaluated for promotion 
based on economic performance.238  
One way to encourage local government officials to comply with 
proposed regulations is to provide relevant environmental “targets” on which 
the local cadre’s promotions are evaluated. 239   The Central Communist 
Party’ (“CCP”) uses the cadre evaluation system to incentivize goals.240  The 
most important goals gain “veto power,” in that the failure to achieve them 
trumps all other accomplishments. 241   The cadre system also provides 
horizontal oversight in that officials can be held collectively liable for the 
performance of any individual on the same level of government.242  This 
creates a scenario in which officials at the same level monitor each other’s 
work to ensure the legislation is being implemented.243  In practice, the cadre 
evaluation system has been successful in implementing policies.  For 
example, China’s one-child policy has been implemented effectively because 
the policy’s goals have “veto power.”244   
                                                      
236  See supra Part II.A.-B.  
237  See supra Part X. 
238  See supra Part III.B.  
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Including “veto power” targets in a soil remediation policy will ensure 
that local officials do no simply ignore the soil remediation policy. Instead of 
pressuring the EPBs to turn a blind eye to local pollution, local officials will 
assist the EPBs to enforce the policy.  “Veto power” targets could remove the 
biggest enemy of environmental law implementation: local officials.245  
Initially, it may be a little strange to include mention of veto targets in 
legislation because the cadre evaluation system relates to promotions within 
the communist party, which is formally separate from the Chinese 
government.246  Legislation usually does not mention the party explicitly.247  
However, cadre evaluation targets have started to appear in environmental 
legislation.  For example, amendments to the Law on the Prevention and 
Control of Water Pollution (Water Pollution Law) uses the cadre system to 
incentivize local officials.248  Article 5 of the Water Pollution Law stipulates 
that the fulfillment of water environmental protection targets constitutes a 
part of the performance evaluation of local people's governments or their 
responsible persons.249   
However, including cadre evaluation targets in environmental policies 
creates both problems if there are used to falsify information.250  Officials 
will feel conflicting obligations:  the obligation to maintain economic 
growth and the obligation to enforce environmental laws that tend to slow 
economic growth.  Local officials may be tempted to falsify the data they 
report back to their superiors.251  Data falsification has been a problem in the 
past.  A 2008 survey found that 81% of officials provided false data about 
their village’s income.252 
One solution to the problem of data falsification would be to allow the 
national level MEP offices to conduct random inspections of areas that claim 
to have met the soil remediation goals.  This would provide a level of 
national oversight. However, it would be difficult for this program to be 
                                                      
245  Id.   
246  The Chinese Communist Party has had a political monopoly since the founding of the People’s 
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effective.  China is a large country,253 so a random sampling could only 
cover a small amount of China’s soil.  Moreover, officials have a time period 
of four to five years to be promoted,254 so the MEP would have a four to five 
year window to catch the falsified reports before the officials moved on.  So 
in addition to any national-wide sampling program, the remediation policy 
should include channels for public participation and oversight, as explained 
in the next section.  
 
C.  A New Remediation Framework Should Include Channels for Public 
Information and Participation  
 
Any central government remediation policy should require local 
governments to publicize initial soil pollution levels and soil pollution levels 
after remediation is complete.  Such a policy would have three benefits:  it 
would 1) apply additional pressure on the local officials to implement a soil 
remediation policy, 2) inform citizens of their living environment, and 3) 
allow citizens to oversee claims of successful remediation.   
Including public participation creates additional pressure for 
enforcement.  As discussed, the Chinese public participates in environmental 
issues even when uninvited.255  The internet and social media have created 
new pathways for public participation.  In response to illegal dumping in 
Weifang, Shandong Province, activist Deng Fei has started a campaign on 
the Twitter-like service, called “Weibo,” asking his followers to post pictures 
of the rivers in their hometown. 256   Deng Fei has over three million 
followers, some of whom responded by posting their own pictures or 
accounts of pollution in their area.257  The government in Weifang quickly 
responded to Deng Fei’s post, investigating over 700 factories and promising 
RMB 100,000 to anyone that could find the culprit.258  The success of the 
Weibo campaign demonstrates that public participation can ensure 
accountability.  
While it is important that public participation is encouraged, any new 
soil pollution legislation should ensure that the public is informed.  
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Unfortunately, environmental protestors are not always informed and they 
inadvertently act contrary to their interests.259  For example, there have been 
instances in which protestors challenge new, efficient plants that are to 
replace old, more polluting ones.  For example, protests in Shifang and 
Ningbo led to USD 64 million and USD 963 million losses in investments 
respectively.260  Scholars describe this as a “triple-lose” scenario:  1) the 
local economy loses a sound and legitimate project; 2) the project approval 
body loses public confidence; and 3) the public loses what may have been a 
greener outcome.261  After the “successful” protests in Shifang, dozens of 
small chemical plants scheduled for replacement continue polluting as 
normal.262  Part of the problem is that the public often lacks confidence in 
environmental regulation because so many environmental assessments are 
misleading.263  
Providing information about the soil pollution levels will help raise 
awareness of the dangers of soil pollution and indicate that the central 
government is serious about addressing the problem.  With more awareness, 
local citizens affected by soil pollution will draw the connection between 
observed health problems and pollution in the soil.  When government 
officials claim successful remediation, the locals will be able to determine if 
the remediation was actually performed.  With successful remediation, 
public confidence in the regulatory scheme will grow.  If crops have not 
returned and health has not improved, the citizens will have basis on which 
to suspect the pollution has not been remediated.  Citizens can then bring 
claims of failure to implement remediation to the attention of higher 
officials.264  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Soil pollution poses enormous problems for China’s economy, 
national health, and social stability.  In order to combat the problem of soil 
pollution, the central government should enact comprehensive soil pollution 
legislation that clarifies liability and sets a sliding scale of remediation 
standards for polluted soil based on future land use.  However, this is not to 
                                                      
259  See Feng Jie & Wang Tao, supra note 89. 
260  Id. 
261  Id. 
262  Id.  
263  See generally Wang Yue et. al., Xinhua Insight: China Needs Public Consultation Amid Painful 
Protests, CHINA ORG. (July 31, 2012), http://www.china.org.cn/china/Off_the_Wire/2012-
07/31/content_26080663.htm.  
264  Carl F. Minzner, Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions, 42 STAN. J. INT’L 
L. 103 (2006). 
JANUARY 2014 SOIL POLLUTION REMEDIATION REFORM IN CHINA 201 
say enacting such legislation will ensure soil remediation success.  Soil 
pollution legislation should also include targets in cadre evaluation and 
channels for public information and participation to systemically change the 
way China addresses soil pollution.  
